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NATURE OF THE CASE
The district court entered an order that personal property
of Utah Hay & Cattle Company (Utah Hay), a Utah corporation, be
deemed abandoned.

Utah Hay filed a complaint against Holt

contesting the interpretation of a settlement agreement and an
escrow agreement provided for in the settlement agreement which
agreements pertained to the purchase of real property, a ranch.
Some time later Holt merely filed a motion seeking removal of
the personal property from the ranch or it be deemed abandoned.
He never obtained service on Utah Hay and never sought leave of
the court to amend his answer.

The court entered Findings and

an Order declaring Utah Hay's personal property abandoned.

The

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the procedures
declaring the personal property abandoned violated Utah Hay's
constitutional and fundamental right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1.

The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Enter the

Order Declaring the Personal Property Abandoned and Therefore
the Court's Order is Void.
2.

Utah Hay's Right to Due Process As Required By Both the

U.S. Constitution and Utah Constitution was Violated Because
Established Procedures Were Not Followed and Utah Hay Received
No Notice.
3.

It was Error and Abuse of Discretion for the Court to

Enter an Order Deeming the Property Abandoned Because no Intent
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was Shown by Utah Hay to Relinquish its Property Interest and
other Judicial Remedies were Available to the Court to Force the
Removal of the Personal Property.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court entered an order against Utah Hay on
March 16, 1985.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Utah Hay seeks reversal of the final order entered by Judge
Burns on March 16, 1985, and an order declaring that the
District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Utah Hay relies on the following facts:
1.

Utah Hay filed a complaint against Robert Holt and

others on December 30, 1983, seeking specific performance or in
the alternative damages based on "a written agreement with the
Defendants to purchase certain real property".
of the Complaint).

(See paragraph 4

The real property is a ranch in Iron County,

Utah.
2.

On January 9, 1984, Utah Hay filed an amended complaint

adding other factual allegations and a cause of action based on
estoppel but still seeking specific performance or in the
alternative damages.

-3-
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3.

On February 7, 1984, defendants Robert Holt and

Escalante Farms, Co., (collectively referred to as "Holt")
answered the amended complaint.

With the answer Holt filed no

counterclaim,
4.

On April 16, 1984, Mr. Wright, plaintiffs1 attorney,

filed a Motion to Withdraw.
5.

By minute entry dated May 2, 1984, the Court granted the

Motion to Withdraw.
6.

On July 10, 1984, Holt filed a Motion for Plaintiffs to

Remove Personal Property or For Declaration that the same be
abandoned to Defendants.

Mr. Holt filed an affidavit with an

exhibit listing at least thirty-seven pieces of equipment and
other items comprising the personal property Utah Hay had
purchased from the Bekins Bar V Estate.

(See Exhibit 2 to

Holt1s Affidavit).
7.

The motion was not mailed to Mr. Wright, Utah Hay's

former counsel.
8.

The notice of hearing was filed on August 16, 1984,

setting the hearing for Holt's Motion for Removal on September
5, 1984.
9.

The file shows that service on Utah Hay was attempted by

certified mail but that the mailing was returned undelivered.
(See the minute entry dated September 5, 1984.)
10.

According to a minute entry dated September 10, 1984,

Mr. Fain appeared and the matter was passed.

-4-
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11.

On November 17f 1984, the Court signed an Order

requiring removal of the personal property within thirty days or
the personal property be deemed abandoned based on the hearing
of September 5, 1984r granting Holt's motion.

On December 5/

1984, Utah Hay was personally served with the Order.
12.

Utah Hay initiated steps to have the court stay the

enforcement of its Order.
13.

On March 25, 1985, the court denied Utah Hay's stay and

entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which reaffirmed
the removal or abandonment order.

(See paragraph 10 of the

order dated March 25 f 1985.).
In summary, Utah Hay filed a complaint regarding a purchase
of real property, a ranch, and Holt answered.

Five months later

Holt without leave of the court filed a motion, not an amended
answer with a counterclaim.

The motion requested the court to

enter an order requiring Utah Hay to remove personal property or
it be deemed abandoned.

The personal property was not related

to the issues in the complaint.

Although service was attempted,

the record shows the letter to Utah Hay was returned
undelivered.

No proper pleading exists which provides a basis

for jurisdiction as to the personal property.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The district court lacked jurisdiction.

To commence a

separate and distinct claim for relief Holt filed a motion
requesting an order that Utah Hay remove certain personal
'."•' - 5 -
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property from Holt1s ranch or it be deemed abandoned to Holt
legal precedents require that to invoke jurisdiction recognized
legal procedures must be followed.

The Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure establish the legal procedures to be followed to state
a claim and to invoke a court's jurisdiction.
invoke jurisdiction.

A motion can not

Without jurisdiction all actions of the

district court and especially the order dated March 16, 1985,
are null and void.
2.

Due process under both the U.S. Constitution and the

Utah Constitution requires that the established legal procedures
be followed.

In the instant matter a motion was filed in an

attempt to put before the district court a separate and distinct
cause of action.

The district court acted in response to the

motion and thereby failed to follow the established rules.
Further, the record shows that Utah Hay received no notice of
Holt's motion to remove or abandon motion.

Due process requires

an interested party receive notice and have the opportunity to
be heard.
3.

The district court's order declaring the numerous items

of equipment and personal property abandoned was error. A
requisite element of abandoned property is intent of the owner
to relinquish the property right or interest.

No facts are

present in the record to establish Utah Hay's intent to
relinquish its interest.

Further, declaring the property

abandoned was an abuse of judicial discretion.

The district

court had other remedies available, such as, assessing Utah
-6-
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Hay for any damages Holt suffered or commencing a contempt
proceeding against Utah Hay to compel action.

In declaring the

property abandoned the court abused its discretion.

Argument I.
THE DISTRICT COURT
LACKED JURISDICTION
TO ENTER THE ORDER
DECLARING THE PERSONAL
PROPERTY ABANDONED AND
THEREFORE THE COURT'S
ORDER IS VOID
To act a court must have jurisdiction.

If a court acts

without jurisdiction its actions are null and void.
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of when
jurisdiction attaches.

In Muskrat v. U.S. 219 U.S. 346,

31.S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911) the Supreme Court was
confronted with the issue of whether a "case" or "controversy"
existed.

At 356 the Court defined "case" as follows:
A "case" was defined by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall as
early as the leading case of Marberry v. Madison, 1
Cranen, 137, to be a suit instituted according to the
regular course of judicial procedure.

Thus, to have a case, a suit must be filed according to
established procedures.

In the same case at 361 the court

referred to judicial power as the right to determine actual
controversies "duly instituted" between adverse parties.

In

other words before any court has a case or controversy proper
judicial procedures must be followed to trigger jurisdiction.

-7-
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The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the issue as to
whether a party was properly before the court and whether a
default judgment had been properly entered in Roberts v.
Seaboard Surety Co., 29 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1947).

At page 749 the

court
stated the following:
There must be some appropriate application invoking the
judicial power of the court in respect to the matter
sought to be litigated; such as the filing of a
petition, complaint or other proper pleading, for it is
in this manner that the court's power over the subject
matter is invoked.
To obtain jurisdiction over the subject matter a proper pleading
must be filed.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP) embody the
established judicial procedures that must be followed to invoke
jurisdiction.
Rule 8(a) of the URCP defines a "claim for relief" as
follows:
(a) Claims for Relief.
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for
the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief
in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded.
In short, if a party makes a claim for relief he must state the
factual basis for the claim and he must make a demand for the
relief sought in a pleading.

Included in Rule 8(a) within the

scope of a pleading is a counterclaim, a cross-claim or a
third-party claim.

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Rule 7(a) of the URCP also discusses pleadings.

It states

as follows:
(a) Pleadings.
There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a
counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a
cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a
third party complaint, if a person who was not an
original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule
14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be
allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an
answer or a third-party answer.
Under this rule a pleading must be a complaint, answer, reply to
a counterclaim, answer to cross-claim, third-party complaint and
third-party answer.

Rule 7(a) with limited exceptions not

applicable here further provides that no other pleadings are
allowed.
To invoke jurisdiction in accordance with the URCP one of
the forms of pleadings must be filed.

Rules 7 and 8 provide for

no other pleadings to initiate properly a claim for relief.

A

proper pleading under the rules must be filed to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court.
A court has no discretion as to whether or not to follow the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It is duly bound and has a firm,

unequivoial obligation to follow the rules.

(See Rule 1 of the

URCP).
By filing a motion Holt attempted to invoke the jurisdiction
of the court to grant him relief for his claim.

Under the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure a motion is not included among the
definitions of a pleading and a pleading must be filed to invoke
the jurisdiction of the court.

-9-
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It matters not that the parties were before the court on
another matter.

(Here the other matter involved contractual

rights in a real property transaction).

To invoke the

jurisdiction of the court on a separate and distinct claim Holt
wished to assert against the plaintiff, Utah Hay, Holt had to
file a recognized form of a pleading.

Holt's failure to place

his claim properly before the court left the court with no
jurisdiction.

With no jurisdiction over the subject matter the

court's order is null and void.
Even if the court might deem Holt's motion to be a
permissive counterclaim under Rule 13(b), Holt had filed his
answer five months before the filing of the motion and under
Rule 15(a) a party may amend a pleading only by leave of the
court.

The record shows that Holt sought no leave of the court

and the court granted none.

Also, a supplemental pleading under

Rule 15(d) is allowed only upon motion and reasonable notice,
neither of which exists in the record.
Also, Holt's motion related to the personal property of Utah
Hay.

Utah Hay's complaint against Holt pertained to a contract

involving real property.

Holt's motion sought removal of the

property or an order deeming the property abandoned.

Utah Hay's

complaint sought specific performance under the contract or
damages.

Thus, Holt's motion attempted to place claims before

the court for resolution totally unrelated and separate and
distinct from the issues already before the court.

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Holt's

motion embodied a separate claim and therefore needs an
independent basis for jurisdiction.

It is possible that

jurisdiction for Holt's claim could have been accomplished if
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure had been followed.

Without

following the Rules, Holt's motion is spurious and the district
court's actions based solely on Holt's motion are also spurious.
Holt's motion failed to place his claim properly before the
court and left the district court with no jurisdiction over the
personal property.
The order of March 16, 1985, is null and void because the
district court lacked jurisdiction.
II.
UTAH HAY'S RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS
AS REQUIRED BY BOTH THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
AND UTAH CONSTITUTION WAS
VIOLATED BECAUSE ESTABLISHED
PROCEDURES WERE NOT FOLLOWED AND
UTAH HAY RECEIVED NO NOTICE
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the
Section 7 of Article One of the Utah Constitution provide for
due process.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in pertinent

part states:

"...nor shall any state deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property without due process of law,..."
Utah Constitution states:

The

"No person shall be deprived of life,

liberty or property, without due process of law."
Section 7, Utah Constitution.

-11-
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Article One,

The U.S. Supreme Court in construing the meaning of due
process stated the following:
By "due process of law" is meant one whichf following
the forms of law, is appropriate to the case, and just
to the parties affected. It must be pursued in the
ordinary mode prescribed by the law; ...
Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, Cal. Ill U.S. 701,
708; 4. S.Ct. 663; 28 L.Ed. 569; (1884).
In Lloyd v. Third Judicial District, 495 P2d. 1262 (Utah
1972), plaintiffs who were impecunious wives sought to
accomplish service of process by mailing the appropriate
pleadings to the last known address of the husband.

The Utah

Supreme Court held that the mailing constituted an abridgment of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and thus violated due process.
The prior argument of this brief established that in the
instant matter the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were not
followed.

Failure to follow the established rules constitutes a

violation of due process. Therefore, the District Court's Order
was unconstitutional.
An integral part of due process is notice.

The record shows

that the attempted service on or notice to Utah Hay by certified
mail was not accomplished.

The record included the certified

mailing returned undelivered.

After the court signed the

order requiring Utah Hay to remove numerous items of personal
property during the dead of winter and within a thirty day
period which included the holiday season, it required personal
service.

This sequence of events is a paradox.

When finally

-12-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

served on December 5, 1984, Utah Hay was presented with a fait
accompli and had no opportunity to present factual or legal
arguments to counter Holt's claim.

The district court had

acted.
Fairness did not underly this sequence of events. Without
notice and the lack of compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Utah Hay's right to due process was violated.

The

Court's order requiring removal or deeming the property
abandoned violated due process and is unconstitutional.
III.
IT WAS ERROR AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
FOR THE COURT TO ENTER AN ORDER DEEMING THE PROPERTY
ABANDONED BECAUSE NO INTENT
WAS SHOWN BY UTAH HAY TO
RELINQUISH ITS PROPERTY INTEREST
AND OTHER JUDICIAL REMEDIES
WERE AVAILABLE TO THE COURT
TO FORCE THE REMOVAL OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY
The legal concept of abandoned property is well-established
and includes intent as one of its elements.

In Jackson v.

Steinberg, 200 P.2d 376 (Or. 1948), the court defined abandoned
property at 377:
Abandoned property is that of which the owner has
relinquished all right, title, claim, and possession,
with the intention of not reclaiming it or resuming its
ownership, possession or enjoyment.
See In re:

Manse Spring and Its Tribrituares, Nye County,

108 P.2d 311 at 315 (Nevada 1940), Karageris v. Karageris, 302
P.2d 850 at 852, 145 C.A. 2d 556 (Cal. 1956).

Intent is an

essential element of the legal concept of abandoned property.

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The record in this manner is void of any facts demonstrating
the intent of Utah Hay to abandon its numerous items of personal
property.

Without a showing of Utah Hay's intent to abandon its

property the district court's order is erroneous and is contrary
to the legal elements comprising abandonment.
Also, in declaring an abandonment the district court totally
and completely abrogated the property rights of Utah Hay: The
district court abused its discretion.

Judicial discretion has

been defined by the Supreme Court of Minnesota courts as
follows:
Judicial discretion is the sound choosing by the court/
subject to the guidance of the lawf between doing or
not doing a thing, the doing of which cannot be
demanded as an absolute right of the party who asks
that it be done. Chapman v. Dorsey, 41 N.W.2d 438 at
442 (Minn. 1950).
The United States Supreme Court has also discussed
discretion in Langes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 51 S.Ct. 243, 75
L.Ed. 520 (1931) as follows:
The term "discretion" denotes the absence of a hard and
fast rule. The Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1, 9. When
invoked as a guide to judicial action it means a sound
discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not
arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is
right and equitable under the circumstances and the
law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the
judge to a just result. (at 541).
In exercising its discretion where no firmly established rules
exist, a court is charged with the responsibility of reaching a
fair result.

-14-
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In the instant matter there is no established remedy for the
failure of an owner to remove its property from the premises of
another.

The district court's remedy of abandonment was unfair

and inequitable.

Mr. Holt's claim was that the personal

property caused interuption to his normal ranching operations.
Yet Mr. Holt's concerns when balanced against the total loss of
Utah Hay's property right are clearly outweighed.
The district court had other remedial sanctions available
such as, compensation to Holt for any damages shown or
reasonable costs or rental value or a contempt proceeding
against Utah Hay for failure to comply with the removal order.
These practical and workable alternatives the district court
ignored.
The district court's order deeming the personal property
abandoned was error because no intent to abandon is present.
The order was an abuse of judicial power and contrary to
well-establsihed principles concerning the just exercise of
judicial authority.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing the Order of the District Court dated
March 16, 1985, should be reversed and this Court should enter
an order declaring that the District Court lacked jurisdiction.
DATED this JjL- day of November, 1985.
Respectfully Submitted.

jk
WALLACE T. BOYACK
Attorney for Appellant
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ADDENDUM

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated March 16,
1985.
Order showing service on December 5, 1984,
Motion for Plaintiffs to Remove Personal Property or For
Declaration that the Same be Abandoned to Defendants filed
July 10, 1984.
Answer of Robert Holt filed February 7, 1984.
Amended Complaint filed January 10, 198 4.
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THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
Michael D. Hughes
Attorney for Defendant
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: 801/673-4892
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UT7JI
SUNSTAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
INC., a Nevada Corporation,
and UTAH HAY AND CATTLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,

)
)
;

•

>

•

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
-

.

Plaintiffs,
vs.

)

ROBERT HOLT, et al.

)

Defendants.

)

Civil No. 10345

The Plaintiffs1 Motion for Stay of Proceedings to
Enforce a Judgment filed pursuant to Rules 60 and 62 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure came before the Court on the
13th day of March, 1985. And the Court, having viewed the
files and reviewed' the Defendants objection to Plaintiffs'
objection and being fully apprised of the premises, hereby
enters the following Findings of Fact and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The

Plaintiffs'

motion

seeks

a

"Stay

of

Execution" on an Order executed November 17th, 1984 by this
Court.
2.
hr

Said Order executed November 17th, 10P4 was to

iv.-rved
onHoward
the
Plaintiffs
Digitized by the
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben and
Clark Lawrequired
School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiffs

to

remove

certain

personal

property within thirty
held

to

have

property

from

the

Defendant's

(30) days, or alternatively, to be

abandoned

his

interest

in

such

personal

property.
3.

As required by this Court, this Order executed

November

17th,

1984

was

served

on

the

December

5th, 1984. There was neither a motion

trial or for an amendment of this Cider

moving

party

on

for a new

filed within ten

(10) days of service pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
4.

The Ord~r

itself

is Leif-effecting, to-wit,

the Order requires no further enforcement
effective

and

to

vest

title

to

the

in order to In-

personal

property,

referenced therein, to the Defendant.
5.

The Plaintiffs' main objections to the Order

are two-fold. First, that this Court is stayed by bankruptcy
proceedings from entering such and order and, secondly, that
the entry of such an order was otherwise inequitable unck.-r
the premises.
6.

Upon an

examination

cf the

file,

+
4.t

Court

finds that the personal property abandoned to the Defendants
was ordered sold by the Honorable Glen F. Clark in the first
bankruptcy of Bekins Bar V. Ranch Corporation on the 20th of
October, 1983.
7.

In

reference

to

the

automatic

stay

m

the

Eeki.-.t- }\»r V. Ranch bankruptcy :rilec; in the Centra] Division
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the DistrictMachine-generated
of Utah.
t-hiQ Cnur-*- fin*?*

~~ ±u~ w-.^;« ~x
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n

the documentar}' evidence, that the Honorable John H. Allen
executed

an

specifically

order

on

stating

the

10th

that

day

the

of

January,

automatic

stay

1982

of

the

bankruptcy court was no longer in effect.
8.

This Court

further

finds

that the

personal

property was ordered removed from Defendants1 real property
no later than February 10th# 1984 by the Honorable Clen E.
Clark.
9.

Subsequent

thereto,

on

the

basis

of

documentary evidence, the Honorable Judge Eckart Thompson,
sitting as the bankruptcy judge for the Eastern District of
California, liited the automatic

stay with respect to the

personal property on the 19th day of hpril,
ordered that any livestock

1984 and indeed,

left by the Plaintiffs on that

date be deemed abandoned automatically to the Defendants.
10.
reference
order

to the personal

executed

Plaintiffs

As there was no stay order in existence in

on

property, this Court

un November
December

5th,

17th,

1984 and

1984

property to be removed in thirty

finds its

serve J c r. the

requiring

the

personal

(30) days or to be deemoa

vacated and abandoned, to be within its jurisdiction and not
stayed by the bankruptcy proceedings.
11.

The files before the Court indicate that the

order was served upon Plaintiffs on December 5th, 19R'l, and
as of this date, Defendant's motion to stay the effect of
the order dated November

17th, war

not fiicc
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thereafter with this Court.

for a mont;

to

tat
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

BASED UPON the foregoing Findings oi: Fact nnd the
evidence shown in the file, the Court concludes as follows:
1.

There

was

no

automatic

stay

in

effect;

precluding this Court from issuing its order in reference to
the personal property which was the subject matter herein.
2.

That the Plaintiffs1 motion that the issue of

the personal property's abandonment be reopened at this time
should be denied.
DATED this

//tit

/&

day of March, 1985.

5.

HARLAN BURNS

District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 14th day of March, 1985 I did
wail a true and correct

copy of the above and

foregoing

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Scott A. Gubler,
attorney for Plaintiff, at 205 East Tabernacle, St. George,
Utah 84770, postage.prepaid.
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THOMPSON, HUGHES & RE3ER
Michael D. Hughes
Attorney for Defendant
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: 801 /6"73-489?
IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
SUNSTAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
INC., a Nevada Corporation,
and UTAH HAY ANII CATTLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER TC
REMOVE PERSONAL
PROPERTY OR ALTERNATIVELY
THAT THE FAKE BE
ABANDONED TO DEFENDANTS

ROBERT HOLT, et al.

*&^:=£5W&&&&+&&%f
The

Civil No. 10345

endant s .
Plaintiffs'

motion

for

Defendants

vo

move

their personal property, or for declaration that the same ke
abandoned to Defendants, came on for hearing on the ^th G?.\>
of

September,

their

1984. The

attorney,

Michael

Defendants
D.

being

Hughes,

and

represented
the

by

rtaintif f L>,

though being notified, failing to appear either in person or
through appointed counsel, and the court havinr reviewed the
motion of the Defendants and the affadavit of Pobort Holt
thereof and there being no contrary affadavit being filed in
i

opposition thereto and the court being fully apprised of the
premises, the court having entered its findings of fact ana
conclusions of law hereby orders as follows:
0/-T. JjQs^.^1
;ji;

TI:- I4'c2rv-

~J±.££^±Jtlz\SLjO:iZL

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
errors. ;\ELE JMliiAY Pr.dC l-.L 00'JHTY. ITAr
•SEITITEJS

******

JfcZLc

1» That the personal property of the Plaintiffs be
removed at a time convenient to both the Plaintiffs and the
Defendants

in this case. Such time to be arranged by the

Plaintiffs by direct contact with Robert Holt, and or his
attorney, within thirty days. That
personal

property

is

not

in the event that such

removed,

that

the

same

be

thereafter be deemed vacated and abandoned to the interests
of the Defendants.
2. That the Lis Pendens filed her^iiyis null and
void and has no effect at law or in equity.
!qi

IkHmi

-

r„ HfrL

^

A

-"//

/

/

/
!

f

/

/ y
if

/fjfMtptiV'k'1'
3.

HARLAN BURNS

D i s t r i c t C o u i t Jud<je
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THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
Michael D. Hughes
Attorney for Defendants
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: 801/673-4 892

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUNSTAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, )
INC.,
a Nevada Corporation,
and UTAH HAY AND CATTLE
)
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
)
Plaintiffs,
vs.
)
ROBERT HOLT, et al.
]

"

•

Defendants.

MOTION FOP PLAINTIFFS TO
REMOVE PERSONAL PROPER!Y
OR FOR DECLARATION THAT
THE SAME BE ABANDONED TO
DEFENDANTS

•

•

:

'

:

-

»

'

:

•

"

'

•

.

•

-

"

"

•

•

•

-

"

-

.

'

)

Civil No. 10345

COME NOW the Defendants

above-named

and hereby

move the Court for an order requiring Plaintiffs to remove
the personal

property previously purchased by Defendants

from Bekins Bar V Ranch, the same being situate upon the
premises owned by Defendant in the above-entitled action.
Defendants further move for an order requiring that the
Notice of Lis Pendens be cancelled, and that in the event:
said personal property is not removed within thirty days of
a court order issued in accordance with this motion, that
the same be declared

abandoned

to the interests of the

Defendants.
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DATED t h i s

day of J u l y ,

• i/Vj^1* •

*-'

198 4

i'UJOf 9^

"

' *•*

fc

^V,

MICHAEL D.^HUGHESA
Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

;

^
.,'.,/.

day of July,

1984, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing MOTION FOR PLAINTIFFS TO REMOVE PERSONAL PROPERTY
OR FOR DECLARATION TliAT THE SAME BE ABANDONED TO DEFENDANTS
to Sunstar Development Company, Inc., at ?05 No. Carson
Street, Carson City, Nevada, 89701, to Utah Hay and Cattlo
Company, c/o James Fain, at 7601 Ribier Avenue, LaMont,
California, 93201, and to Douglas Furth at 800 Continental
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid.

.SECRETARY
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Douglas L. Furth
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-8900

IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SUNSTAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
INC., a Nevada corporation, and
UTAH HAY AND CATTLE COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,

ANSWER

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 10345

v.
ROBERT HOLT, C. STANLEY HUTH,
ESCALANTE FARMS, CO., POBERT HOLT,
GENERAL PARTNER, a Utah
partnership,
Defendants.

Defendants Robert Holt and Escalante Farms, Co. answer
plaintiffs1 complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state grounds upon which
relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Defendants answer plaintiffs' specific allegations as
follows:
1.

Deny paragraph 1 for lack of information.

LAW OFFICES
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
A PROFESSIONAL. CO«H»0«ATIOK<

EtGMTH FLOOR CONTINENTAL BANK BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101
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2.

Admit paragraph 2.

3.

Defendants deny paragraph 3.

4.

Defendants admit that it entered into an agreement

with plaintiffs wherein plaintiffs could purchase certain real
property described as Bekins Bar-V Ranch if the sum of $2,125,000
were paid on or before 10:00 a.m. on December 23, 1983.
Defendants admit that the legal description attached hereto as
Exhibits "A" and H B" is correct.
5.

Defendants deny paragraph 5.

6.

Defendants admit paragraph 6.

7.

Defendants admit paragraph 7.

8/

Defendants deny paragraph 8.

9.

Defendants deny paragraph 9.

10.

Defendants deny paragraph 10.

11.

Defendants deny paragraph 11.

12.

Defendants deny paragraph 12.

13.

Defendants answer paragraph 13 as it answered

paragraphs 1 through 12.
14.

Defendants deny paragraph 14.

15.

Defendants deny paragraph 15.

16.

Defendants deny paragraph 16.
THIRD DEFENSE

Plaintiff could have and should have raised these claims
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah and
therefore plaintiff is collaterally estopped from making these
claims.
~2~
LAW OFFICES

FABIAN & C L E N D E N I N
AI»*t0^t»$IONALCOH»,OHA1i«.iN

EIGHTH FLOOR CONTINENTAL BANK BUILDING

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64101

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Utah Statute of
Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1953 as amended).
DATED this i-?frVday of January, 1984.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation

Doug!
j q l a s L. Z r i t f t h
Attorneys Jtfir Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I personally mailed a copy of the
foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment on this

*-/

day of

January, 1984, by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
J. MacArthur Wright
ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES
P.O. Box 339
St. George, Utah 84770

i&

g&**n«

-3LAW OFFICES

FABIAN Bt C L E N D E N I N
A PWOrC»»IOM*L C O M O h » l l O N

EIGHT H 1^ LOOM CONTINENTAL UANK BUil.DtNC

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 841C"
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ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES
By J. MacArthur Wright
Attorney for Plaintiffs
60 North 300 East
P. 0. Box 339
St. George, UT 84770
Phone: 628-2612

^
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SUNSTAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
)
INC., a Nevada corporation;
and UTAH HAY AND CATTLE COMPANY,)
A Utah corporation,

AMFNDFD COMPLAINT

)

.

Plaintiffs,
.

)

•

vs.
)
ROBERT HOLT , C. STANLEY
HUTH, and ESCALANTF FARMS, CO.,
ROBERT HOLT, GENERAL PARTNER,_
A Utah partnership.
)

Civil No.

Defendants. )
COME NOW Plaintiffs and for a cause of action alleae a^
follows:
1.

Plaintiff, Sunstar Development Company, Inc., is a

Nevada Corporation and Plaintiff, Utah Hay and Cattle C01r.pn.n3>, is
a Utah Corporation with its principal place of business in Iron
County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant, Robert Holt, is a resident of Washington

County, State of Utah; Defendant, C. Stanley Huth, on information
and belief, is a resident of the State of California; and
Escalante Farms Company is a Utah general partnership.
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3.

That the acts complained of hereinafter were

performed in the County of Iron, State of Utah.
4.

Plaintiff# Sunstar Development Company, Inc. and

Plaintiff, Utah Hay and Cattle Company, entered into a written
agreement with the Defendants to purchase certain real property
sometimes referred to hereinafter as the "Bekins Bar V Ranch," or
simply "Bar V Ranch/* located in Iron County, State of Utah, the
description of which is attached hereto as Exhibits "A," "B" and
"C" and made a part hereof by reference as if incorporated herein
in their entirety.
5.

Said written agreements provided that Plaintiffs

pay to the Defendants a sum of $2,125,000 for said property.
6.

Payment was to be made to an escrow account at

Cedar Land Title, Inc. in Cedar City, Utah on or before 10:00
a.m. on December 23, 1983, escrow # 2824.
7. Plaintiffs informed Defendant, Robert Holt, who war
acting as agent for himself and the other Defendants, that it
would be difficult for them to arrange the financing by December
23, 1983, but that they would make every effort to do so.
8.

Defendant, Robert Holt, stated upon being told of

potential problems with the short time available to Plaintiffs
that he was only concerned about getting the money and that extra
time until January 16, 1984 was no problem.
9.

Plaintiffs relied upon Defendant's, Robert Holt's,

agreement to extend the time the funds must be made available
until January 16, 1984.

VN43

2
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10.

Plaintiffs promised to the said Defendant, Holt,

to pay an additional sum to cover purchase of irriqation pevots
and other costs in the amount of approximately $150,000.00.
11.

Defendant, Holt, agreed to accept said total sum

of $2,275.00 if paid, (or in escrow), by January 16, 1984.
12.

Defendants should be required to specifically

perforin the said agreement to sell said property to Plaintiffs by
the 16th day of January, 1984.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
13.

The allegations of paragraph

1 through 12 are

hereby realleged and incorporated herein by reference.
14.

Defendant, Holt, represented to Plaintiffs, to

real estate brokers working upon said proposed sale and to title
company officers involved in the escrow of said transaction that
he would accept the funds of the Plaintiffs if paid into escrow
by January 16, 1984 even though the original due date of December
23, 1984 was about to or had elapsed; that Plaintiff, in reliance
upon said representations expended sums in excess of $150,000 to
obtain the financing in order to purchase said property.
15.

The Defendants should be estopped from refusing to

sell said property to Plaintiffs if the purchase price as
modified is placed in escrow by Janaury 16, 1984.
16.

That if the Defendants fail to perform their

agreement to sell said property to Plaintiffs on or before
January 16, 1984, Plaintiffs will lose the benefit of their
bargain and will, suffer damages in excess of $2,000,000, the
exact amount of which will be proved at trial.

VN43

3
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment on their first and
second causes of action as follows:
1.

Defendants should be ordered to sell said property

to Plaintiffs for the sum of $2,275,000.00.
2.

In the event Defendants are not ordered to sell

said property to Plaintiffs as prayed for herein, Plaintiffs
should be awarded their damages in the amount to be proved at
trial.
3. For costs of court.
4. For such other relief as to the court may appear
proper.

jfjt
Dated this

^

/

day of

^dUtild*

y-

, 1984.

ATKIN, WFIGHT and MILES

1

ue m

jy/MacAPTHUP WFIGHT, Attorney
Wr the Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' Address:
905 Three Fountains
Cedar City, UT 84720

VN43
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:'rTOWNSHlP 3V

M-f ;; 33
OW ill. RANCC 16 WEST, SALT LAKE

-- AND MERIDIAN:

SECTION 1: The South half of the Southeasi Quarter; and the Southeast Quarter 'tt
of the Southwest Quarter;
S •yj'-'f
SECTION 3: Lotu 13 to 24, inclur.ivr; the Sou then at Quarter and tha North haif^
of the Sovithwcst Quarter;
SECTION 10;. The Northeast Quarter;
SECTION Ji: All
SECTION 12: All
:'lv *'f#iS

TOWNSHIP 36 SOUTH, RANCC 15 WEST, SALT IAKC UASE AND MERIDIAN:

* > ,&M
SECTION 7:

Lots 9, 10, 11 and 12:
^
^iv/fl
Deglnning a t the Northwest c o r n e r of Lot 8 and running thenct
'i/$\i&
East 305 f e e t ; South 65*44' East 2061.0 f e e t ; South 268.0 f e e t J *\}~Wk
West 2640.0 f e e t ; North 1320.0 fiscc to the p o i n t of beginning. -,K^W

'.t'"^ ^* ^

,

Beginning a-t the Southwest corner of Lot 4, and running thenct North
360 feet; South 65'44' Kast 875 feet; Went 799.0 feat to the point o:
>J ,

beginning.

\r.\\Wfj&

LXCF.PTINC THEREFROM, that portion lying within tha bounda of .tht ; '$k
State Koad right-of-way.
'\r%\\. •!-'g
SECTIONS 9 and 16:

! :i

*

Commencing a t the Northwest c o r n e r of the SWtSW^ of S . c t i o n 9, taid
township and r a n g e , and running thence S o u t h e a s t e r l y to a point 6.38
c h a l n j East and 2 . 6 3 c h a i n s South of the place of beginning; South '£.
23.50 c h a i n s ; thence S o u t h e a s t e r l y to a p o i n t 7.85 chains North of $J
a p o i n t 6.65 c h a i n s West of the Southeast corner of tht NWHNA of
S e c t i o n 16; thence S o u t h e a s t e r l y to a p o i n t 8.34 c h a i n s North of the
S o u t h e a s t c o r n e r of the SVAtNW^ of Section 16; thenco South 2.9 chain I
W*st 2.36 c h a i n s ; North 6.08 c h a i n s ; West 5.64 c h a i n s ; thenct N o r t h e a s t e r l y 4.94 c h a i n s to a point 7.12 chain* West and 16.16 c h a i n s
North of the S o u t h e a s t c o r n e r of the SWithnA of S e c t i o n 16; thtneo Wei
12.17 c h a i n s ; North 4.44 c h a i n s ; West 1 chain; North 4.0 c h a i n s ! to j <r
p o i n t of bop, I n n i n g .
?#lTji' -tit
I'XCKPTINV. TIIERETROM, t h a t p o r t i o n l y i n g w i t h i n the bounds of t h t SUI
Road r i x h t - o f - w a y .
SECTION 1 3 : Lotu 3 t o 12,

.^•m

inclusive;

EXCEPTING THEREFROM, that portion lying within tha dlstributi
of the New Castle irrigation Conpany.
O
TOWNSHIP 35 SOUTH, RANCE 16 WEST, SALT U K X UASE AND MERIDIAN;

l/0t(

..'- 1

SECTION 23: The West 60 acres of Northeast Quarter; and tht East half of
East half of the Northwest Quarter.
H&lDUMt-^fyx!}

TOWNSHIP 35 SOUTH, RANCE 15 WEST, SALT UJCE hASE AND

*' ' ' '' *'*"*'•

SECTION 7: The Southwest Quarter;
SECTION 9: The Southeast Quarter;
EXCEPTING THEREFROM an undivided 1/8 Interest

M'l

SECTION 10: The South 140 acres of the Southwest Quarttr*

•I '••••'

EXCEPTING THEREFROM an undivided 1/8 InttrtltiUJjJaLl o i l r i g h t s , !

'i

SECTION 28: Commencing at the Southwest corner of Section 126, aald township And *
range and running thence East 1<>0 rods; thenco North 160 rods; |thencs
West 4 rods; thence South 16 rodn; thence Vest 156 rods; thenco South
144 rods to the point of beginning.
;
••'.'j'-l '••;•'«'

v.:i«
Continued-

..

EXHIDIT "A"
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.,M
•

•

ih a l l tnott'i!'* aiul o t h e r I r r i g a t i o n IMJU I pmcnt, i n c l u d i n g b u t
10 Chat r»|»cc tf t e a l ly d e s c r i b e d below;

•1$m

•

•

• <•

.••••• ' U

i '
1

^

••»

i i

>J

•' ' '. ; I

Well »)

I.OC.U ion

I'mnp

XV corm*r Lot 12
Si»c. 7, T. 3b S f |
K. 15 W.

IVorli'ss 10"

HK corner Lot 0
Sec. IH. T. "Jo S,
R. 10 W.

Inlmston 10"

St c o r n e r i.oc 6
S e c . 18, t . 30 S.
K. 15 W.

Worthlnjjton 10"

Newman 75 HP Ei
iV •

vv

US 100 \U> E l e c t

.US 100 HP Elect

! • ' : • • • •

' • • • • { v .

12

•

.

•

$U\NU\ U t 5,
S e c . 18, T. JO S.
K. 15 W.

Wintrocli 10"

SWVNE\SW\ of See. 3 ,
T. 36 S . , R. 16 W.

l.ayne 6 Howler' 12"

•

,

•

•

•

#

'

V

US 100 HP
' ' •"•

.

$

$

^

lit

'K-\'%$

'

^

w

-

> 1,

',.(V

SW^SF.V.St\, of Sec. 3 ,
T. 36 S . , R. 16 U.

l.nynt! & Bowler

NKVSW\ of Sec. U
T. 36 S . . R. 16 W. .

hryuri Jacki;on '
12-

US 12S IIP Klect
- f. -{H

SK\SF.\ of Soc. I I ,
T. 30 S . , K. 10 W.

Vii}%ft 6 F l r a c c n l.cfK 12° "

CE 100 HP Elect
V
">•

:;I-:VNW\, of

I \osv h Klrr*tenlvr>;

US SO HP Electl

Johnston.10 M

Newman 200 HP I

Sn-.

12,

T. 36 S . , K. Id W.

to

'

US 150 UP Elect
t ' 1*'.

'

11

, : ''M

' : •• 1 : . ' . " : ^ •

Motor

SW^.Vl,NWV. of Si-C. 11,
T. 16 S. , K, 16 W.

T

••¥
Electric*- ; j>>'

* V-tt.
••'.if j . ' :

•v

. , :.:-v.^ii
X
. • I

iMf?
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feet)
-M
H i l l i n g ( 2 . 79 a c r e f e n c ) and s t o , c k v a t e r i n g
of 2250 o n M r , 9200 s h e e p , 250 swlr : a n d 9 l»orr.es (1 16.17 a c r e f r e t ) .
V
:
379) Sjrne as 7 1 - 1V/0,
Mipplcncntal o n l y .
10)
I r r Igai ion hO.OO ; i c s , s u p p l e m e n t a l s t o c k .
65)
1r r igac Ion ^ 0 . 0 0 a c s , s u p p l e m e n t a l s t o c k /
211) I r r i g a t i o n 160.00 a c s , s u p p l e m e n t a l s t o c k .
212) I r r i g a t i o n H H . 9 0 a c s , s u p p l e m e n t a l s t o c k ,
372) I r r i g a t i o n 20*1.80 a c s , s u p p l e m e n t a l s t o c k . r t
37M) I r r i g a t i o n 110.70 a c s t s u p p l e m e n t a l s t o c k .
J75) I r r i g a t i o n 1 8 6 , 2 0 a c s , s u p p l e m e n t a l s t o c k .
378) I r r i g a t i o n 2 2 1 . 3 0 a c s , s u p p l e m e n t a l s t o c k . 3V•a (71 - 1 8 0 2 ) I r r .
1 "551.20 a c s , no s t o c k .
-a (71 - 1 3 9 5 ) I r r .
2^0.00 a c s , s u p p l e m e n t a l s t o c k .
171-1 899) i r r i g a t i o n
J<«.20 a c s , s u p p l e m e n t a l s t o c k .

Application No. 10852 (71-1 370) Dunes t i c vis e 4 f a m i l i e s ( 2 . 9 2 . a c r e

Applies t Ion No. 1751?
Appltca tion No. 15981
Applica cion No. 15633
Applica clon No. 16395
10398
Applica
tion
No.
108 54
Applica
Appl lea tion No. 108 5b
Applica t Ion N o . W>85?
Applica tion N o . 16360
Applica tion N o . 12510
Applica I Ion No. 108 52
Applica tion No. 1685^
t ion No.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, postage prepaid, this
day of November, 1985, to the following person:
Michael D. Hughes
Thompson, Hughes & Reber
Attorney for Appelees
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
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